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The Research Problem 
There is a lack of ontology in the study and explication of innovation. Does this 
matter? It matters because ‘innovation’ has become an important word in the 21st 
Century, reflecting all that is modern, progressive and exciting in a complex world. 
This is reflected in every phase of daily existence in modern capitalist economies. 
Firms are urged to be innovative to gain or sustain a ‘competitive edge’, consultants 
advertise their strategic advice as the essence of innovation, local communities’ 
survival depend on the capacity building that comes from innovation, schools are 
exalted to have innovation in their curriculum, universities promote themselves as 
leaders in innovation. Politicians respond to the need for supporting all the above 
through policies for enhancing such innovation in the nation. 
 
Ontology is “…the study (or a theory) of being or existence, a concern with the nature 
and structure of the ‘stuff’ of reality.” (Lawson, 2003, p. 12) Any study or research of 
a concern has a metaphysical theory of ontology as a precondition to modelling and 
empirical validation, whether implicitly or explicitly stated. This is the foundation of 
all inquiry. Ontology illuminates the range of empirical phenomena that potentially 
can be investigated. When it comes to innovation, the ontology is poorly conceived or 
implicitly assumed in an extremely simplistic approach. The reason is that the human 
actions underlying innovation have rarely been explicated in any clear consistent 
manner. Innovation as a process is complex and poorly understood because it is 
deeply rooted in the uncertainty of the future world in which each particular 
innovation will inhabit in the form of a new product, a new process, a new movement 
or a new organisation. All that is known is that innovation brings change and 
something ‘new’ emerges, which cannot be modelled (or only very sketchily 
modelled). As a result, it is often portrayed as exogenous, thus anything that cannot 
be accounted for by quantifiable measures is called “the residual” and comes about 
via innovation. Empirical studies from as far back as Denison (1962) clearly show 
that this “innovation” residual is very significant, accounting for far more than 50 per 
cent of economic growth. Economic history studies have confirmed the crucial role of 
innovation in their empirical narratives tracing innovation back in history.1    
 
The research problem that emerges is how to identify and exposit a realist and 
sustainable theory of human action in the innovation process. Economics 
conceptualises a general ontology of the economic agent based on human action, to 
which innovation is only one specific application. The results of this approach have 
been inadequate. The next section identifies these inadequacies within the history of 
economic thought and argues for an ontology that places innovation at the centre of 
human agency that is in pursuit of novelty. This can form the basis of an endogenous 
model of innovation and its significant impact on the analysis of economic 
development. Allen Oakley’s extensive work on the problem of human agency is 
briefly outlined in the following section with a view to using his theorising as the 
basis for a realist ontology of innovation. Then, novelty in human agency is 
specifically addressed, using heterodox economists thought and contributions from a 
number of innovation-based sets of literature which provide insights into human 
agency specifically contextualising innovation in their professional concerns. This 
produces a human agency path of innovation which is specified and then used in a 
planning framework applied to the traverse (or structural change path) and for 
important public policy consequences that such a construction entails.  
 
Inadequate Orthodox Ontology of Innovation 
The mainstream orthodox economic view of human action is based on the ontological 
theory of homo oeconomicus (or “rational economic man”). This is the ideal 
deductivist-logic of an isolated human agent who applies optimal economic rational 
decision-making calculations to all commercial based alternatives. The representative 
rational economic agent has the capacity to make all the information processing and 
computational calculations required to optimise any choice alternative faced in terms 
of accounting and opportunity costs. The aggregation of these representative agents 
produces optimal equilibrium outcomes. There have been many critiques of this 
economic agent, essentially from two perspectives. One is that such calculations 
require superhuman powers in appreciating all the costs and benefits involved, and 
then projecting these into the unknowable future (e.g. Simon, 1975). This results in 
fundamental uncertainty that cannot be reduced to some probability distribution (see 
Lawson, 1988). The other is the lack of attention this representative agent pays to the 
real-world content and meaning of human action to the point that a fiction emerges 
divorced from reality, while advocating a particular idealised view of “free-to-
choose” capitalism (e.g. Lawson, 1997; Boland, 1997). 
 
From the innovation perspective, this orthodox view of human agency has produced 
what Legge and Hindle (2004, p. 25) call an “ignorance” of the “entrepreneur” who 
brings forth innovation: The general equilibrium approach “…considers the ‘state of 
the world’ long after the last innovation has taken place and no further changes can be 
expected.” In essence, entrepreneurs in a perfectly competitive economy have no 
economic incentive to innovate when knowledge is instantaneously transmitted. 
Innovation ends up being exogenous in the orthodox economic model and, thus, 
resolves two problems. It overcomes the inability of human agents to predict the 
future and it ensures the consistency of their general equilibrium model. However, it 
sacrifices any claim to analysing innovation within capitalism and its operation in 
either microeconomic business management terms, or in macroeconomic economic 
development terms. 
 
Legge and Hindle (2004) identify two attempts at re-introducing innovation into 
orthodox micro- and macro- economics. At the microeconomic level it is in the form 
of principal-agent theory, clearly enunciated in the managerial economics literature 
associated with organisational architecture (for example, Brickley et al., 1997), where 
the principals are shareholders (represented by the company board) who set up an 
organisational structure that ensures their wishes are carried out by hired managers. 
This brings the entrepreneur “owner-shareholder” into direct relation to the original 
entrepreneur “owner-manager”, both acting as the innovative spur for “the firm”. 
Legally, a limited liability company is different from its owners (Kay and Silberston, 
1995, p.88); and empirically, corporate firms have been measured in terms of co-
ordinating and combining core competences as a cooperative process in tune with 
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market reality (Acs and Audretsch, 1991). Both aspects undermine the principal-agent 
theory. The problem of human agency in orthodox economics remains. 
 
At the macroeconomic level, the new growth theory led by Romer (1994) relaxes the 
standard model by focusing on the cost of new knowledge (or innovation) and the 
time taken to disseminate it. Only part of new knowledge is appropriated internally in 
the firm, while the rest spillovers into the community to be appropriated by other 
entrepreneurs. Legge and Hindle (2004, p.32) describe the results as “unexceptional” 
and consistent with the pioneering work of Smith (1776). However, the two critiques 
of human agency remain, with no resolution of the uncertainty and representative 
agent dilemmas in the new growth theory; i.e. the two dilemmas prevent any realist 
ontological account of the way innovation is endogenous to the economic system.  
 
The Problem of Human Agency: The Oakley Contribution 
Allen Oakley has devoted much of the latter part of his scholarly career on unpacking 
the problem of human agency within the study of economics; from the classical 
writers, through the Austrians (old and new) to the neoclassical mainstream. In 
Oakley (2002), the project extends to devising a humanist reality of economic agency 
as a foundation for a reconstructed economic theory. The first principle Oakley 
asserts is that empirical research has to be based on some ontology (explicitly or 
implicitly); otherwise one cannot identify what a researcher focuses on when 
examining complex data of human activity. The second principle is that this 
ontological base needs to be grounded in a realist perspective of human activity in 
which actions are determined by the structured situations actually existing, while also 
affecting this very same structure by the actions taken. (Oakley, 2002, pp. 18-20). For 
Oakley the problem of human agency in economics stems from orthodox economics 
rejecting the second principle by adopting a positivist (or physical scientistic 
methodological) view of autonomous existence and inherent orderliness which denies 
any role for real-world agents in an open system, then constructing complex methods 
of interpreting data on the implicit acceptance of this very simplistic and normative 
abstract ontology. 
 
The Oakley contribution is to represent human agents as they have been perceived by 
philosophers working on the anthropology of social activity, and then to situate such 
human actions within the economic phenomena of capitalism. This provides the basis 
for a realist economic ontology and consequently a more appropriate empirical 
methodology upon which to develop an economic theory. The richness of Oakley’s 
contribution to this enquiry cannot be adequately summarised, and any brief overview 
will be inevitably a caricature of the thesis he expounds. What follows is merely some 
crucial elements of Oakley’s thesis that form the basis for the ontology of innovation 
to be constructed in the next few sections. 
 
There needs to be, in Oakley’s view, a defensible ontology that can explicate human 
nature within an economic cosmos. The irreducible aspect of human agency in the 
economic sphere is centred on choices, decision-making and actions. A satisfactory 
ontology needs to capture the voluntaristic role of independent human agents in the 
three aspects of the economic sphere, but also recognise the deterministic social 
structure that governs all economic phenomena. This is the position developed by the 
critical realism literature led by Lawson (1997, 2003). Oakley builds on the critical 
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realism account by introducing a rich vein of constructive philosophic writings by 
major social theorists, including Alfred Schutz, Karl Popper, Herbert Simon and 
Anthony Giddens. The following extract encompasses the dualistic relation between 
voluntarism and determinism: 
This social and economic cosmos is the unintended collective product of their 
individual actions immanently and volitionally guided by the situationally imposed 
rules, facilities and constraints that shape these actions…But because of uncertainty 
and the need to depend upon other people within their social environment, the 
deliberated actions of individuals will for the most part generate phenomena that 
include outcomes that were not wholly expected and not wholly desired. (Oakley, 
2002, p. 192)  
 
The way this dualistic relation occurs within the Oakley constructed thesis is that 
human agents search for a balance between contingency of human action and 
containment which limits this human action. Contingency is a “free-to-choose” 
agency concept that is strongly qualified by what agents know (or have learnt) based 
on their cumulative biography. Individual capacities emerge from this learnt past. In 
this concept, history matters in a very personal way and can be linked to Kalecki’s 
economic growth dynamics, where the long-run is merely the cumulation of a chain 
of short-period decisions and actions2. Thus, there is no long-run optimality in a 
realist account of history; instead there is a series of short-period events that cumulate 
as a biography into an ever-changing long-run dynamic. Choice in such a dynamic is 
contingent on the past and backtracking is impossible3, which results in irreversible 
change. 
 
Containment is what Oakley calls the “situational conditioning of human agency”. 
Agent’s decisions and actions are conditional on the extant information, available 
facilities, and imposed rules (or conventions) that particular societies develop and 
implement. This is the institutional framework of society that arises out of the 
situational conditioning. As societal beings, human agents learn that it is in their best 
interests to co-operate by habits and routines with the institutional manifestations of 
the collective society. This containment of “the free spirit” has two important 
implications. One is the recursive (or feedback) effect in which the endogenous 
cumulative biography of individuals both shape and are shaped by the institutional 
constraints learnt (or understood). The path of economic development and 
transformation is “locked-in” on the basis of this recursive effect. The other 
implication is that society is prevented from chaos by institutional containment and 
reasoned agent behaviour in the face of these containments (we generally drive on 
one accepted side of the road). This is the “complexity” concept of an open system in 
which “…the collective behaviour of many basic but interacting units” evolves over 
time, with self-organisation and adaptation (Coveney and Highfield, 1995, p. 7). 
  
If society is totally contained by its institutional manifestations, without any room to 
move outside the given information, facilities and rules; society is in a closed system 
like a chess game where all the rules are structured and unchangeable. Human action 
would then be limited to whatever can be created within these highly structured 
limitations. Chaos occurs if, on the other hand, there is no containment of rules and 
structures. A completely open system emerges as with children playing their own 
developed games where the rules are changed in an ad hoc fashion as these games 
progress in a highly creative way.4 Economic phenomena rest on situations that exist 
between these two extremes. Oakley argues that it is the relative weighting of the 
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balance between contingency and containment in any specific real-world setting that 
explicates the sources human agency and determines their nature. If the weight of 
containment is greater than contingency, then the system favours generalisability 
based on strict logical arguments. If the weight of containment is less than 
contingency, then the system favours less generalisability leading to more 
complexity-based arguments which overall create and dissolve patterns over time. 
The crucial issue for Oakley is to capture the right balance between contingency and 
containment in any particular phenomenon under investigation (Oakley, 2002, p. 
216). In the discussion below, this question of balance is referred to as C&C.5 
 
From this ontological basis, Oakley identifies three research enquiry agendas in 
economics. The first is to “…seek out any ontologically occurring regularities and 
universalities that characterize the generation of a particular type of phenomenon.” 
The second is based on where such characteristics are not found, “…to supply the 
regularity and universality that scientific inquiry demands”. This requires much 
deeper research insights that can be ascertained from complexity-type modelling. 
Finally, the researcher needs “…to design interventions that maximize the 
containment and minimize the contingent remainder affecting agents’ deliberations 
and decisions” (Oakley, 2002, pp. 215-7). This latter enquiry is into praxis, where 
change comes from understanding how processes work. Policy design strategies 
should aim to allow agents volitionally to be directed and contained towards desired 
outcomes; otherwise the policy changes would not be sustainable. By combining this 
agenda with previous work on Adolph Lowe (Oakley, 1987 and 1994), a traverse (or 
structural change path) can be devised by working backwards from desired end to 
required means in a search procedure referred to as retroduction. Lowe uses this 
approach to make “regressive inferences” and so derive necessary links back to 
motivational patterns that can be successful in achieving the desired end.6 
 
Novelty as the Basis of Innovation 
Innovation can be defined as the application of knowledge in a new form to increase 
the set of techniques and products commercially available in the economy. These 
techniques can be technological or organisational based. Forms innovation can take, 
in order of their impact on economic development (from low to high), are: (i) 
continuous (or “Kaizen”) occurring daily at the work place; (ii) incremental based on 
research and development (R&D); (iii) radical discontinuous based on 
entrepreneurship (both corporate and individual/team); (iv) technological systems 
change based on a cluster of innovations; and (v) techno-economic paradigm shift due 
to major structural change (e.g. steam engine, information technology). Each form of 
innovation can dovetail into higher order innovation, thus becoming increasingly 
more important to society. The essence of this definition is novelty in terms of 
knowledge applied (or commercialised) in the economic sphere of human activity. 
 
The ontological question is why do human agents carry out innovation? The 
exogenous explanation as “manna from heaven” fails on the realist ontology 
framework. Non-mainstream (or heterodox) economic paradigms are attempting to 
develop alternative perspectives to rational economic man, but they all “…work with 
different strategies for explaining agency.” (Davis, 1999, p.464) This results in 
diverse and arbitrary explanations that, when applied to innovation, lack coherence. 
Nevertheless, from these diverse views can emerge a realist ontological account. 
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Outside the economics discipline there are a number of innovation-based sets of 
literature which provide insights into human agency specifically contextualising 
innovation in their professional concerns. All the professional literature has useful 
insights without providing an ontological foundation to innovative behaviour.7 There 
is an implied homo oeconomicus assumption in the business professions coming from 
its roots in orthodox microeconomics, with the uncertainty and representative agent 
dilemmas remaining intact. Despite this, the strong empirical basis of their research 
provides a rich source of data that can inform a realist ontology of innovation.     
 
Oakley opened his own investigation of human agency by stating that “…it is this 
capacity [of agents] for dealing with novelty that is most relevant.” (Oakley, 2002, p. 
31, fn3). This section aims to look directly at novelty as the basis for innovation in 
theorising a sustainable endogenous ontology of innovation using both heterodox and 
professional innovation-based literature. Oakley (2002, p.31, fn.4) notes “…the 
agents and strategic actions in focus…are confronted with the problem of adapting 
habits and routines in order to make decisions in the face of novel situations.” Only 
the successful adoption of the new routines can lead to the wide diffusion of 
innovation. Novelty brings into play the balance between C&C. 
 
Using C&C, a spectrum can be identified that encapsulates all forms of innovation. At 
one end of the spectrum is the entrepreneurship literature that espouses spontaneous 
responses to economic and social conditions in the way contingency far outweighs 
containment, resulting in radical innovation (or significantly different incremental 
innovation). Human actions by agents at this end are strongly influenced by what 
Keynes (1936) calls “animal spirits” (p.137) in an environment where containment is 
relatively weak. Society encourages the “spontaneous urge to action” (p. 144) of 
entrepreneurs. At the other end of the spectrum is the technology management and 
organisational behaviour literatures that espouse key management practices (or rules 
and conventions) to economic and social conditions in the way containment far 
outweighs contingency, resulting in continuous and incremental innovation. Human 
actions by agents at this end are strongly constrained by history with the individual 
and institutional biographies derived from the past, but still within what Keynes 
called “the entrepreneur economy” in which “entrepreneurs” are compelled to make 
investment decisions (Keynes, 1936, p. 150).8 Complexity allows the arbitrary 
typology of this simple C&C spectrum to be used in any real-world situation. For 
example, an initially constrained innovation can over time shift to the spontaneous 
end of the spectrum as society and its participants in entrepreneurial decision-making 
become more open in the systems employed.  
 
Two major contributions are identified and examined in Oakley (2002) to the concept 
of novelty. These contributions by Choi and Shackle can be grafted onto the C&C 
spectrum to derive ontology of innovation. Choi (1993) recognises uncertainty as the 
stimulus for innovation.9 Opportunities arise with the uncertainties of life 
(‘disequilibria’ in orthodox economics). Choi identifies the sources of these 
uncertainties as: (i) ontological complexities, (ii) unpredictability of the future, (iii) 
interdependence between agent and others, and (iv) limitations of the mental 
capacities of agents.10 With such difficulties, any situation in which agents need to 
make a decision and act into the future requires a set of guidelines provided by a 
“repertoire” of habits and routines established from the past. Choi calls these 
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“paradigms” that have evolved from experience. The more novel the situation, the 
more agents need to search for the most appropriate paradigm and then modify it to 
best address this situation. Innovation comes out of this process. This “search and 
modify” behaviour can fit into the C&C spectrum, by recognising the extent of 
contingency and containment in each decision. The more modification is done to any 
paradigm, the further the agent is on the spontaneous end of the C&C spectrum. 
 
The deeper ontological question that Choi’s analysis brings forth is to explain how 
“search and modify” behaviour operates in a world of fundamental uncertainty to 
produce innovation. This behaviour cannot be based on any calculation of what is 
objectively probable, but instead on the subjectivity of what is deemed possible. This 
is the starting point for Shackle to explore the role of imagination in this “search and 
modify” agency process. Shackle has published a significant body of work on the role 
of imagination, driven by inspiration, as the source of creative solutions to the 
problem of fundamental uncertainty when it comes to making decisions into the 
future and acting on them. In the process of devising such inspirational solutions, 
novelty and innovation are introduced into the system. From this proposition, it is 
clear why the “…world in which enterprise is necessary and possible is a world of 
uncertainty” (Shackle, 1967, p. 133).  As Oakley (2002, p. 111) notes: “For Shackle, 
the very existence of profit as capitalism’s raison d’être stems from uncertainty 
manifested in expectations of value”, where “…the differences between the value of a 
current stock of goods and their expected future value…[are] subjectively assessed by 
the holding agent.” 
 
Placing future time into a reasoned rational space through imagination, Shackle turns 
“mechanical man” into “inspired man”, without giving up formalism. This Shackle 
does by identifying degrees of potential surprise that form a sequel in any 
contemplated course of decision and action. Oakley (2002) develops this account of 
Shackle’s work in three detailed chapters. In the context of innovation, what Shackle 
contributes is a subjective (yet formal) process of innovation by handling uncertainty 
through the imagination. Shackle’s weakness on the situational conditioning of agents 
(identified by Oakley) can be overcome by incorporating Choi’s paradigms within the 
C&C spectrum. This then provides a thorough ontological theoretical construct from 
which to understand innovation and its diffusion. 
 
For completeness, the diverse heterodox and professional contemporary literatures on 
innovation are briefly placed within this C&C construct. None of these sets of 
literatures establish any clear prior ontology that encapsulates the whole spectrum. 
Their own respective limited rationales situate innovation only on one part of the 
C&C spectrum.  
 
At the extreme spontaneous end of the C&C spectrum exists the neo-Austrian 
literature (see Kirzner, 1973), in which the entrepreneur is seen as alert to 
opportunities for taking advantage of discrepancies and gaps in the market system. In 
this sense, the neo-Austrian version of the entrepreneur is an arbitrager; a persona 
embodying foresight, knowledge and willingness to act in situations of widespread 
ignorance of the disequilibria that exist (Canterbery, 1995, p. 262). Exploiting 
opportunities in a rational planning manner adds to the value of the final product by 
the techniques that are ‘put to use’. The appropriation of monopoly power in the 
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market is evidence of creative and successful entrepreneurship. Such monopoly power 
is not seen as permanent by neo-Austrians unless such power is underwritten, 
subsidised and otherwise supported by governments and their regulatory agencies. 
Shackle would feel comfortable within this body of literature, if not for him 
recognising that action of entrepreneurs must be ontologically situated within a social, 
conditioning and regularising environment. The entrepreneurship business literature is 
based on the same human agency rationale, but at the implementation (“how to do it”) 
level. Not surprising that the role of containment (especially government) is seen as 
part of the exogenous environment rather than situated inside the agency ontology.11   
 
At the other constrained extreme of the C&C spectrum exist the Institutional and neo-
Schumpeterian literatures. Innovation in this approach comes from the 
“technostructure” of the large corporations that form the planning system of capitalist 
economies and which guides economic development. This agency group embraces 
specialised knowledge, talent and experience (especially through R&D) in specific 
technology-based areas where the market system (and its small enterprises) is 
symbiotically subservient to the decisions of large corporations, while governments 
need to acquiesce to the planning system’s power and influence. This exemplifies a 
highly constrained innovation process. Galbraith (1967) developed this large firm 
dominance approach from Schumpeter (1942) with a managerial class concerned to 
protect and support increasingly sophisticated technology in a planned approach. 
Power lies with the technostructure that serves partly the capitalist-owners through 
share price and dividend sustainability, with increasingly generous serving to 
themselves via remuneration packages and perquisites of office.  
 
The mainstream business management literature is compatible with the Institutional 
approach, but with a microeconomic perspective of the firm as an administrative unit 
that develops a ‘life’ of its own and is not distinguished from the actors who operate 
inside this organisation. Penrose (1959) is the major inspiration for this perspective.12 
The focus is on the firm’s internal development through a dynamic capabilities 
framework. In this approach, it is human agency itself that gets sublimated under the 
co-ordination of core competencies. The human agency rationale at the management 
level remains essentially homo oeconomicus as explained above. At the level of the 
general employees in an organisation, Amabile (1988, p.55) addresses the ability of 
workers to be creativity by asserting: “…do what you love and love what you do.” 
This creativity comes from internal motivation to engage in rewarding and 
challenging work, which is cultivated through organisational creativity management. 
Locked-in to the containment end of C&C, agents’ ability to be creative and then take 
the innovation through to implementation can only be seen as exogenous i.e. internal 
motivation comes from outside the research agenda. It follows that the problematic 
with the management construct is its inability to relate what are very useful 
observations to capitalism’s raison d’être in matching expectations with time-
bounded uncertainty.  
 
A new set of innovation literature based on the notion of the “Creative Class” 
provides a more complex problematic for the C&C ontological construct. The major 
theoretical and empirical work is based on Florida (2002) that identifies innovation in 
the creativity of an elite class of talented individuals. These elite prefer places that are 
diverse, tolerant and open to new ideas. Such regions develop effective, speedy and 
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concentrated flows of knowledge - which Florida calls “creative capital”, as it is the 
prime asset in the region’s economic development. Entrepreneurship and business 
development is attracted by these elite. Regions throughout developed economies are 
promoting themselves as centres with a particular unique blend of creative capital, but 
its diffusion quickly dissipates over distance significantly limiting the spillover 
effects to nearby regions. The creative elite are at the spontaneous end of the C&C 
spectrum, and are attracted by a broad set of social and cultural conditions that reside 
within specific geographic boundaries. This makes the creative elite highly contingent 
on what attracts them to the region, yet the elite themselves create the innovative 
environment. There is an ontological problem in having regional development 
authorities searching for and supporting this elite when it is this very elite that creates 
the appropriate environment. Regional policies based on attracting and retaining this 
elite need to develop a “containment” environment which works against the elite’s 
own predilections and is exogenous to their own creativity. Also, the footloose nature 
of these elite implies that another region may find it easy to ‘poach’ such highly 
prized individuals.13  
 
Overall, the C&C spectrum provides a way of understanding innovation across the 
whole breadth of innovation forms. It also indicates the specific ontological 
limitations of various approaches to innovation proffered by scholars from different 
research disciplines. The remaining part this chapter examines how this ontological 
account of innovation can provide a sound basis for examining the endogenous paths 
of economic development that innovation has the potential to create. This path 
development accords with Oakley’s scholarly concern for Adolph Lowe’s political 
economics. 
 
The Human Agency Path through Innovation 
The ability to move forward from the ontological exposition of innovation above to a 
realist human enquiry of various aspects of innovation identified by the diverse sets of 
innovation literatures needs a human agency path to be revealed. Oakley (2002, pp. 6-
7) explains that “…full appreciation of the reality around us requires us to adopt a 
‘three-level’ perspective on how it is structured and grasped.”14 This section adopts 
Oakley’s three levels to appreciate the structure of the human agency path of 
innovation and its progress through it.   
 
The path begins where human action is “…conceived of as a self-conscious, 
subjective and cognitive being.” (Oakley, 2002, p. 9) The realist ontology specified 
earlier rejects the homo oeconomicus instrumentalism psychology. In its place Oakley 
substitutes “folk psychology” of thoughts shaped by agents’ mental makeup.15 For 
innovation, at the cognitive level there are specific mental qualities, disposition, 
intention and purpose that are reflected in the characteristics of entrepreneurship 
discussed earlier. Out of the “endless list” that can be made up of these 
characteristics, Schaper and Volery (2004, p. 36) identify three valid traits: (i) need 
for achievement, (ii) internal locus of control and (iii) risk-taking propensity. These 
traits are inevitably subjective and can never be reduced to physical sciences-type 
elements. These three traits provide the pre-existing cognitive qualities that allow 
sensory data to be processed so that opportunities for innovation can be identified. For 
Oakley (1994, fn 19), this “…demands a significant degree of creativity and 
independent insight on the part of the agent, as well as a deep knowledge of existing 
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and potential future production techniques and/or product outputs.” Agents with 
strong concentration of the three traits develop strategic sequence of proposed actions 
that are resource-using while incurring both sunk and transaction costs. Examples of 
such ex ante decisions and actions in the innovation field are R&D, education and 
training, technological management, new product marketing, and crucially, 
investment in new capital goods. 
 
At the second level, the omnipotent optimising (substantive) rationality of homo 
oeconomicus is replaced by procedural rationality. Vercelli (1998) argues cogently 
from first principles that fundamental uncertainty makes any optimisation algorithm 
based on substantive rationality impossible to be expressed in any way that would 
have operational significance. The elements of irreversibility and complexity that 
arise over historical time imply that an adaptive procedural rationality is required.16 
This means that creativity and innovation can only be achieved in a cumulative 
process of learning by doing and acquiring knowledge through implementation of 
acceptable adaptive (non-optimal) conventions and rules. The crucial aspect of this 
rationality is that innovation is a contingent process which achieves outcomes “…that 
cannot fully realize any imposed notion of an optimum.” (Oakley, 2002, p. 168) 
Innovation is a business risk related to changing a product, process or organisation 
which is a matter of fundamental uncertainty, which is different from the chance-type 
financial risk of capitalists when speculating, lending or gambling.17  
 
Situational analysis is the final perspective level which folds into the previous two 
levels. Here, the “free-to-choose” market situation must be replaced with an in situ 
action process where autonomy is counter-balanced by contingent containment. 
Autonomous subjectivism of Austrian economics needs to be weighted up against 
Marxist determinism. In the innovation process, the opportunities and options that 
confront the entrepreneur are bounded by the folk psychology of the entrepreneur(s) 
and the particular procedural steps they take, as well as the actions of other agents in 
response to the same opportunities and the initial actions of the original entrepreneur. 
All this is bounded by the specific institutions and political frameworks that influence 
the development of any particular innovation.18 Often it is the second or third 
entrepreneur who follows the initial entrepreneur in the same innovation process that 
succeeds in the long term diffusion of the innovation.19 Also, sometimes innovations 
(and creative ideas) appear independently of each other around the same time because 
the in situ is very similar, with the first two levels of this agency path being 
congruent.20 The above in situ circumstances narrow the possibilities from which 
innovation is ‘chosen’ and shapes the mentality of the participants in the innovation 
process and its diffusion. 
 
The Traverse in the Political Economics of Innovation 
Enhancement of innovation has become a commercial and political quintessential for 
economic and business development. However, the diverse views and applications of 
the term innovation have shown very little understanding of what innovation is all 
about and how best to enhance its processes. This section will take the ontological 
human agency path of innovation as the fundamental sequential process (or traverse) 
and develop a coherent systems approach to innovation policy for public and private 
sectors within capitalism. The result is a comprehensive political economic 
intervention that enhances innovation systems within a particular geographical 
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boundary; be that sub-national region, national, cross-country regional or even global 
(in terms of, for example greenhouse emission protocols). 
 
The observed traverse is defined as a sequence of irreversible events within the 
structure of production. When a change occurs (or is induced by policy) to alter the 
level of demand or supply in the economy at a macro level, there is a sequence of 
slowly evolving production decisions made by industries and firms in response to 
such changes. An innovation is a disruptive change to the structure of production, 
which results in an observed traverse that requires empirical analysis both from the 
perspective of the behaviour of the change agents involved and the strategies and 
processes that created the traverse path identified. 
 
Confirmed from the ontological discussion up till now is that innovation does not 
come ‘out of the air’. The previous section identified the complex in situ human 
agency path of innovation. Thus, innovation is contingent on this path, which includes 
the institutional and political frameworks of the specified geographical boundary 
under consideration. All innovations come out of a subjective, but tractable, 
complexity-type process. Intervention in the economics of innovation is highly 
commercial (e.g. Bill Gates monopolising information technology) and political (e.g. 
warfare needs for military technology). The task of the political economics of 
innovation is to devise policy-induced interventions that serve the best interests of the 
broader community and not purely the narrow interests of some powerful commercial 
interests and their political supporters. 
 
Adolph Lowe set himself the task to develop an instrumental traverse which is a 
policy-designed trajectory that is based on specified end target goals. Lowe 
considered that these goals must be determined by grass roots support (voluntary 
conformity) and have the supporting systems and ‘instruments’ to deliver what is 
demand-determined. This strategy needs a carefully designed adjustment process with 
targets for each stage of the traverse to be supported by investment perspective 
planning as set out by Michał Kalecki. This Lowe-Kalecki planning framework 
provides the instrumental policy approach for the political economics of innovation 
incorporating the three-level human agency perspective. This planning framework can 
be adjusted to accommodate any balance of C&C in a particular administrative 
region.  
 
Lowe (1976) established an instrumental analytical framework designed to enable 
rules of formal behavioural logic to be applied to economic cause and effect 
sequences over historical time. This framework is particularly aimed at using such 
cause-effect principles to communicate to agents concerned about the goal-directed 
outcomes desired. Agents who want to be involved in entrepreneurial activity need to 
convert these “control design” principles into behaviour and actions that “add-up” to 
the desired macro-level outcomes. For Lowe, the patterns of conduct for innovative 
agents need to deliver a sustainable, equitable and ecologically supportive economic 
environment.21 Once the desired patterns have been identified, then it is critical to 
ensure communication and implementation requirements are accurate and effective. 
This approach directly addresses innovation through the contingent folk psychology 
in the human agency path. 
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Procedural rationality is needed to “handle” fundamental uncertainty that inevitably 
will confront with the future pattern of desired conduct. Analysis and evidence show 
that uncertainty by the “mistake-ridden private sector” causes investment instability, 
thus undermining economic activity and competitive advantage (Courvisanos, 1996, 
pp. 190-2).22 Private corporate investment strategy that is best suited to innovation 
needs a secure business environment, but one which has public policies which support 
continuous development and change (see Kay, 1993). This situation potentially offers 
the opportunity to influence (through containment) agents in their innovation 
activities towards a sustainable outcome. In market-based economic regions or 
nations that lack relevant supportive physical and social infrastructure, there is 
insufficient order and coherence (or containment) to impel the creation of innovative 
sustainable investment projects by the private sector without a state structural 
adjustment policy. 
 
Michał Kalecki’s ‘perspective planning’ (Kalecki, 1986) can provide a specific 
situational analysis into the framework through an investment strategy that establishes 
motivation and voluntary conformity towards goal-directed appropriate goals. A path 
of dynamic diffusion of new technological and organisational systems needs to be 
established that are conducive to innovation for a sustainable physical environment. 
This requires long-term investment strategies to have an incrementally adjusting 
perspective planning approach.23 To achieve this it is necessary to establish specific 
practical short-term goals to induce innovation in investment decisions that eventually 
adds up to the long-term goals specified. The plan must be continually assessed at 
every short-term end-point to see whether it is necessary to revise the goals and the 
strategy for reaching the broad-based long-term scenario. A perspective plan with 
these goals is set up to form a specific investment program in consort with agreed 
human agency rules that deliver the type of sustainability determined by Lowe’s 
‘instrumental analysis’. 
 
Economics and Innovation 
Innovation is central to the study of economics, both in terms of behavioural 
processes and economic development. No innovation and society stagnates. Scarce 
resources can only be distributed more effectively by innovation, both 
organisationally and technologically. Yet, innovation remains poorly analysed and 
even more poorly modelled into the economic ‘science’. Major economic thinkers 
have placed innovation at the centre of their analysis (e.g. Smith, Marx, Schumpeter), 
and others have seen innovation as an important long run development (e.g. Hayek, 
Kalecki, Lowe). A view that innovation can not be modelled because its processes are 
complex, uncertain and therefore indeterminate has dominated economics. Innovation 
can only be seen a posteriori, and this inductivity is unacceptable to economists who 
see their ‘positivist science’ as deductivist and objective. 
 
This chapter adopted the Oakley human agency analysis to show how a reconstruction 
of economic theory using a realist ontology can be applied to developing a model of 
innovation decision-making and action. Oakley models human action by capturing the 
right balance between contingency and containment. This provides the basis for 
understanding the wide gamut of entrepreneurial activity that can be seen as 
innovation: from strongly contingent to heavily contained. A three-level perspective 
of the human agency path provides an approach to modelling an agent’s innovation 
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process. Once this path is appreciated, then, Lowe’s instrumental analysis can be 
adopted to seek the co-operation of entrepreneurs and other agents in the path of 
innovation and its diffusion along generally accepted economic goals. The Kaleckian 
perspective planning of investment can be used to support and guide this innovation 
strategy. With such a process model, the innovation issues and policy debates around 
what sort of society we want in the future becomes a realist ontological necessity.     
 
Economists need to see change agents as operating in a messy world of uncertainty in 
which agents use bounded rationality to satisfice behaviour in a complexity-based 
world. The science of complexity allows investigation of innovation as an open 
system in which the collective behaviour of many basic but interacting units evolves 
over time, with self-organisation and adaptation. A formal process of innovation by 
handling uncertainty through the imagination allows economists not only to 
appreciate how innovation happens, but also to identify systemic failures and 
government intervention can be developed to make change agents balance equitably 
and effectively their crucial decisions and actions. 
 
 
 
 
 13
 14
  
_________________________ 
Notes 
 
 
1 For example, in chronological order: Landes (1970), Rosenberg (1976), von Hippel (1988), Freeman 
and Soete (1997). Many more exist. Quite a few are listed and discussed in Freeman and Soete (1997). 
2 The appropriate quote from Kalecki (1968, p. 263) is: “…the long-run trend is only a slowly 
changing component of a chain of short-period situations; it has no independent entity”. 
3 “I should have…” is pointless, “I can learn from this…” is a useful addition to a person’s biography. 
4 Both examples of chess (closed system) and children’s games (open system) are provided by Oakley 
(2002, p. 209).  
5 Oakley (2002) acknowledges the work of Anthony Giddens in identifying this C&C mechanism. 
6 For a detailed exposition, see Forstater (1999). 
7 Over the last fifteen years, the entrepreneurship discipline has developed much empirical research on 
the characteristics that make up an entrepreneur who introduces novelty into an economic activity. 
Despite this effort (and its reproduction ad nauseam in textbooks), Storey (2000, p. 137) comments 
that “…the identikit picture of the entrepreneur whose business is likely to grow is extremely fuzzy”.  
The management of technological innovation literature has developed a long case study tradition in 
this aspect of strategic innovation that is led by Chandler (1990) and more recently supporting this with 
quantitative measures of change (Ettlie, 2000). As professional guides to strategic management this 
literature has provided a powerful framework for technological commercialisation (see especially, 
Jolly, 1998), but there is no ontological account of what drives this innovation. Organisational 
behaviour literature has argued strongly that innovation comes from engaging individuals in creative 
organisational climates that influence and support creativity, especially in terms of continuous 
innovation (Amabile, 1997). Establishing an environment (or climate) that employees love to work 
within provides support for creativity but does not explain the motivation for such creativity. 
8 This C&C spectrum resolves the problem of using the term “entrepreneur” in two distinct ways. The 
entrepreneurship literature assumes all entrepreneurs are on the spontaneous end of the spectrum, 
whereas the Post-Keynesian literature assumes all entrepreneurs make investment decisions in the 
creation of new plant and equipment from profits. Such investment decisions are implicated throughout 
the spectrum, with the nature of this investment reflecting the form of innovation undertaken (see 
Courvisanos, 2003). 
9 This is in stark contrast to the ostensibly financial incentive (or greed) of homo oeconomicus, which 
has been ontologically rejected earlier in this discussion.  
10 Adapted from Oakley (2002, p.31, fn3). 
11 As a result, the textbooks on entrepreneurship ignore totally the role of government and the play 
scant attention to the creativity environment that can nurture innovation (see for example, Kuratko and 
Hodgetts, 2004).  
12 A significant contribution to this perspective by economists working in this field is Dosi et al.(2000). 
13 Empirical and policy critiques of this “Creative Class” literature have been cogently developed. For 
an outline of these critiques see Rainnie (2005). 
14 Oakley (2002, p. 6) calls this “transcendental realism”. It is based on mechanisms of structure, rules 
and power that generate events and states of affairs. 
15 Oakley identifies Karl Popper at the self-identity mental level (Popper and Eccles, 1977) and George 
Shackle at the economic actions level (Shackle, 1972) as major contributors to this concept of folk 
psychology. 
16 Oakley identifies Herbert Simon as the major contributor to the concept of procedural rationality in 
many of his writings (see for example, Simon, 1986). 
17 On the specific procedural rational steps that need to be followed by an entrepreneur when 
conducting an innovation process, see Legge and Hindle (2004, pp. 161-88). 
18 For example, the innovation path of military technology is heavily circumscribed by the particular 
needs of warfare, from Spartan hoplite to US stealth bombers. Jones (1987) explains these processes. 
19 Legge and Hindle (2004, pp. 74-6) call this the ecological model of innovation, where an initial 
inventor or researcher “discovers” a logical relationship or a physical phenomenon that seems to have 
limited practical applications. The broader innovation applications are provided by the initial 
entrepreneur (or “intrapreneur” in a large corporation), but it is the other entrepreneurs that follow and 
diffuse the innovation who create the larger market possibilities. For example, Henry Ford’s Model T 
  
Ford introduced in 1908 was the start of the great technological thrust of mass-motor vehicle market, 
but it was General Motors and Alfred Sloan (and then many other motor vehicle companies with minor 
innovations) that made the motor vehicle ubiquitous. 
20 Some examples of simultaneous discoveries are food canning, aluminium smelting (Hall and 
Heroult), counter-cyclical government macroeconomic policy (Keynes and Kalecki). 
21 See Courvisanos (2005) for a full account of this ecologically sustainable innovation policy 
framework. 
22 See also Richardson (1960) for details on lack of co-ordination in markets for investment and the 
systemic failures that this creates. Richardson goes on to specify how investment co-ordination through 
information agreements and industrial concentration can assist in developing micro-goals in policy-
oriented strategies. 
23 Vercelli (1998, p. 274) in his conclusion explains why long-term goals need to be established: 
One of the main reasons for the deterioration of environmental problems may be 
ascribed precisely to the myopia of economic agents increasingly obsessed by very 
short-run objectives. Short-run rationality produces a profound irrationality in the 
longer run. Only a broader long-run rationality may produce a process of sustainable 
development avoiding deep regrets. 
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